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STILL SEPARATE AND STILL UNEQUAL
MARILYN V. YARBROUGH*
From an early date in the history of this country, universal
public education has been recognized as essential for political
and personal reasons.' In Brown v. Board of Education,2 a
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments."3 Numerous judicial opinions before and after Brown
repeat this theme.4
Today, effective education remains a prerequisite for personal
development. In addition, quality education is an important
political goal, as is demonstrated by the recently pervasive pre-
occupation with "global competitiveness."' One difference, how-
ever, is that we no longer hear these arguments made in refer-
ence to public education as we have come to know it. Indeed,
* Associate Provost, University of North Carolina; Professor of Law, University
of North Carolina School of Law. This Essay represents my third examination of the
consequences of school choice schemes on equal educational opportunity. Much of the
foundational and informational material found here is also found in those previously
published essays. See Marilyn V. Yarbrough, School Choice and Racial Balance:
Silver Bullet or Poison Dart? 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 25 (1992); Marilyn V.
Yarbrough, Educational Choice and the Constitution, in QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 173 (1994) (Fourth Annual
Constitutional Law Symposium, Constitutional Resource Center, Drake University).
Those commentaries, adapted from public speeches, address public policy and consti-
tutional concerns related to educational choice.
1. See Horace Mann, The Ground of the Free School System, 5 OLD SOUTH LEAF-
LETS, 177 (1902) (excerpting from his Tenth Annual Report as Secretary of the Mas-
sachusetts State Board of Education, 1846).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Id. at 493.
4. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
222-23 (1982); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brhkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); id. at 238-39 (White, J., concurring); Abington. Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 519 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON & ARNOLD H. PACKER, WORKFORCE 2000
(1987).
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increasingly we find "market solutions" touted as the remedy for
our educational system.6 Although we are constantly assured
that schemes such as "privatization" and "educational (or school)
choice" do not mean an end to universal education, there is evi-
dence that it may effectively end the progress in minority educa-
tion experienced in this country since the early 1960s.
Americans of all races have become increasingly disenchanted
with the notion that racial balance in elementary and secondary
schools is essential to effective education. With increasing fre-
quency, African American advocates and parents have indicated
a willingness to forego racial balance in favor of effective educa-
tion when the two seem incompatible.' A lingering and coun-
tervailing concern of these parents and advocates, however, is
that, as the Supreme Court determined in 1954, separate is
inherently unequal. To the extent that racial imbalance causes
minority or other disadvantaged youngsters to be shortchanged
educationally, all of us, not just minority parents and advocates,
should be concerned. "School choice" schemes that ignore these
concerns do so at the expense of the undereducated minority
children, and at the risk of sacrificing our nation's position in
relation to that of other world powers.
0
I. THE PROMISE OF BROWN I AND II
In 1954, the Court stated that the determination of the effects
of racially separate schools on public education and on students
must be made in light of the contemporary relevance of segrega-
tion to American life.' Citing the lower court's pronouncement
6. In one of the most highly publicized private ventures, Knoxville, Tennessee,
publisher Christopher Whittle's Edison Project joined twelve nonprofit organizations
recently chosen to design and operate new public "charter" schools in Massachusetts.
Jean Merl, Project Will Try To Light Way to Reform, LA. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at
A5. These charter schools are managed under contract with the state but are largely
unfettered by local and state regulation. Id. The Edison Project, headed by former
Yale President Benno Schmidt, is the second for-profit operator to enter the arena.
Id. Education Alternatives, Inc. operates public schools in Baltimore and Miami. Id.
7. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Paul M.
Barrett, Brown vs. Board-High Court To Revisit School Desegregation; Some Blacks
Do, Too, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1991.
8. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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as indicative of the effect of racial separation on educational
opportunity, the Court adopted the Kansas district court's find-
ing that "[slegregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law... .,' In
other words, forty years ago, the Court, aided by psychological
and sociological studies of the time, recognized that even where
"[n]egro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are
being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifica-
tions and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors," sepa-
rate facilities violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. °
Approximately fifteen years later, in 1968, the Court consid-
ered the legality of a "freedom of choice" plan, one Virginia
county's response to Brown's order to eliminate de jure segrega-
tion." After noting that eighty-five percent of the black pupils
in the district continued to attend the historically black school,
the Court determined that such a plan was constitutionally
impermissible, mainly because parents were constrained by
custom and fear in exercising their choices.'2 Professor Paul
Gewirtz of Yale Law School, in his examination of the concept of
choice as a corrective technique in school desegregation actions,
has noted that one could not help but recognize that the choice
to be made in the middle 1960s in Virginia was a tainted one:
tainted by "racially identified schools and the many other effects
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic public re-
sponsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.
9. Id. at 494. Justice Marshall observed that the Court was adopting "a finding
in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the
Negro plaintiffs." I&. (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 492.
11. Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
12. Id. at 441.
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of a regime of segregation." 3
Professor Gewirtz continued: "Preferences and choices were
skewed by established institutions, established patterns of be-
havior, established information, and an established psychology,
that were rooted in discrimination."" He analogized these
tainted choices to "market failure" in the economic realm,'5 but
emphasized that "[in the 'end-state'-that is, once discrimina-
tion and its effects have been eliminated-nothing in the equal
protection clause prevents the government from adopting poli-
cies that give effect to individual choices.""6 This optimistic pre-
diction assumes that discrimination and its effects can be elimi-
nated in the near term.
A. The Next Forty Years
A recently published report of a study of American public
education reveals that racial segregation in our schools has
reached the highest levels since 1968,17 the year that the Court
decided Green v. New Kent County School Board.'8 The Har-
vard Project on School Desegregation reports that 4.6 million of
the nation's 6.9 million African American and 3.7 million of the
5 million Hispanic public school students attended predominant-
ly minority' 9 schools in the 1991-92 academic year.20 Over the
previous twenty-three years, the numbers had decreased for
African Americans while they had increased for Hispanics:
13. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 749 (1986).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 730.
17. William Cells 3d, Study Finds Rising Concentration of Black and Hispanic
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al.
18. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
19. GARY ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANG-
ING PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968, at 5 (1993). "Predominantly
minority" is defined in the report as comprising more than 50% African American,
Latino, Native American or Asian students. Id.
20. Total school enrollment figures and extrapolations were contained in Celis,
supra note 17 (citing ORFIELD, supra note 19).
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PERCENTAGE OF MINORITY STUDENTS IN
PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY SCHOOLS2'
School Year Blacks Latinos
1968-69 77% 55%
1972-73 64% 57%
1980-81 63% 68%
1986-87 63% 72%
1991-92 66% 73%
Today, in addition to continuing external societal influences
and actual physical and social separation, internal constraints
related to the continuing effects of racial separation persist. As
was true in 1968, when schools already have a racial identity,
given a choice, blacks may tend to choose "black schools" and
whites may tend to choose "white schools."22 A freedom-of-
choice plan makes those with the choice responsible for school
integration and therefore invites others to blame them or make
them the targets of hostility if problems arise.' In addition,
victims of discrimination may adapt to the past unavailability of
certain options by concluding that they do not really want them,
a reaction to the cognitive dissonance involved in wanting what
one cannot, or in the past, could not, have.'
Information and coordination problems exist as well. Because
a parent cannot select a preferred racial mix while ignorant of
the simultaneous choices of others, choices are made from in-
complete information. This lack of information often results in
blacks and whites choosing to remain in separate schools.'
Even though the school choice plans that are the subject of this
Essay are generally proposed for reasons other than the racial
makeup of the schools, the continued existence of racially identi-
fiable (and essentially unequal) public and private schools 6
21. ORFIELD, supra note 19, tbl. I, at 7.
22. Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 743.
23. Id. at 744.
24. In other words, compelled separation is an insult and an act of domination,
but chosen separation may reflect pride and a commitment to group self-determina-
tion. See id, at 746.
25. Id. at 749.
26. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
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suggests that these sociological forces that act to increase segre-
gation will affect these plans in much the same way."
As the Supreme Court noted in 1954, the effects of these sepa-
rate schools on public education and on students must be exam-
ined in a contemporary context. To determine whether harm
persists, at least two questions need to be asked. First, we must
ask whether the racial separation that precipitated the lawsuits
that resulted in the Brown decision continues to be an important
concern in public education. If so, we must then determine
whether we can continue to look to the judicial system to assist
in the achievement of desegregation.
B. The Significance of Racial Separation
For many, the decision in Brown confirmed what they already
intuitively knew-that the stigma of inferiority attendant to the
separation of the races was an expected (if not intended) product
of the second class citizenship accorded African Americans in
our pre-1954 society.28 Today, opinion is divided as to whether
that same stigma continues forty years later.
Some argue that, regardless of the stigmatizing effects of the
separation at the time of Brown, today, after several decades of
integrated activities in this country, the taint no longer exists.'
Others, who argue that the stigma remains, might nevertheless
27. In the context of higher education, where one would imagine that parents and
their college-aged children may be less constrained in exercising their choices, the
fifth circuit indicated that support for freedom of choice plans
assumes that black students possess the same freedom to choose as do
white students.
... Brown explicitly recognized that vestiges of de jure segregation
distort the perceptions of blacks. Blacks do not, therefore, make choices
from a tabula rasa. Instead, they choose against a history of racial subju-
gation with its attendant messages of inferiority.
Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 751 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted en banc, 914 F.2d
676, vacated sub nom. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
28. See Kevin Brown, The Legal Rhetorical Structure for the Conversion of Desegre-
gation Lawsuits to Quality Education Lawsuits, 42 EMORY L.J. 791, 805-09 (1993);
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377-78 (1988).
29. See James A. Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown: Evaluating Equality in Higher
Education, 43 DUKE L.J. 1115, 1150 (1994) (arguing that stigma may not exist for
students in predominantly black colleges).
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resent the intimation that black children can only achieve aca-
demically when educated with white children."
Among those who criticize the view that racial mixing is nec-
essary for quality education are those who would argue that
problems of low self-esteem, to the extent that they persist,
should be addressed through increased emphasis on Afrocentric
education or other methods that focus on building self-esteem as
an end unto itself."' Proponents of this line of thought remind
us that as we consider elementary and secondary schools, quali-
ty education is the goal, and to the extent that attempts at
forced racial mixing have not achieved this quality education,
they should be abandoned in favor of other strategies. 2
Many who adhere to this strategy are ardent proponents of
school freedom-of-choice plans. They argue that these plans
would give minority parents control over the education of their
students and therefore would provide more say in how resources
are deployed and a unique and particularized ability to affect
their students' education and self-esteem." They see control
over facilities, personnel and curriculum as a means to achieve
not just quality education, but strong cultural identity and pride
as well.34
Advocates of continued attempts at the integration of schools
suggest that even if racial mixing is not a precondition to quality
education, it is necessary for other social, political, economic,
and educational reasons.35 They suggest .that because ethnic
and social minorities will compose the majority of the American
workforce in the next century, our country's future in world
leadership is dependent upon having a citizenry and workforce
30. See Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for de Jure Seg-
regation To Replicate the Disease, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1992).
31. See Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J.
1285, 1286-87 (1992).
32. See id. at 1303.
33. See Patricia Wen, Boston Schools Approach a New Era Assignment Plan Seen
as Key Step, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 1988, at C1.
34. Id.
35. See Scott J. Davidson, et al., The RIFFING of Brown: De-Integrating Public
School Faculties, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 500-02 (1982); James S. Liebman,
Desegregating Politics: 'All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1463 (1990).
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that is reflective of and cognizant of the diverse cultures that
comprise the country.36
The belief that the education system is the only viable means
of achieving this recognition and acceptance of diverse cultural
attributes derives from the fact that mandatory, universal, and,
in most instances public, education is the common ground on
which citizens of this country meet. Accordingly, integrating the
citizenry at the earliest possible time is the most effective and
efficient manner of fostering interracial understanding and ac-
ceptance. Much has been made of the fact that global competi-
tiveness in a world market requires that minority workers be
well educated and well trained if the country is to take a leader-
ship role in the world. Better education and the education of
minorities with non-minorities is an essential factor in this en-
terprise.
A second line of argument favoring racial mixing in schools
may sound cynical but has significant basis in fact. Some have
labeled this the "green follows white" theory," recognizing that
even in those instances where resources are found to be or are
stipulated to be equal, when whites and minorities have been
educated separately, educational outcomes have invariably been
unequal, with greater resources devoted to the education of the
white children. 8 Advocates of freedom-of-choice plans suggest
that the lack of control over these resources leads to the inequi-
ties. When largely white school boards have exclusive control
over resources as well as pupil and teacher assignments, the
resources are not deployed in a manner that overcomes the ineq-
uity. Whatever the reason, largely white, principally suburban
schools produce better educational results than largely minority,
principally urban schools that expend a comparatively equal
amount of finds. 9
36. See David G. Carter & James P. Sandler, Access, Choice, Quality, and Integra-
tion, 23 EDUC. & URBAN SOCY 175, 183 (1991).
37. This phrase is often used in African-American communities to describe the fre-
quently observed phenomenon of resources (green referring to money) being redi-
rected to new projects as whites move out and blacks move in.
38. See generally, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); KOZOL, supra
note 26; ORFIELD, supra note 19.
39. Several reasons can explain this anomaly, not the least of which are the high-
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Even if we were to determine that racial mixing is not itself
an important goal, there is growing evidence that socio-economic
class rather than race causes the difference in educational
achievement.0 If class does matter and students from lower
socio-economic backgrounds suffer more educational disadvan-
tage than their middle and upper class peers, to the extent that
so many more minority students than non-minority students are
poor, minority students suffer disproportionately. Therefore,
mixing socio-economic classes invariably means mixing races, a
potential catalyst for better education for poor students and,
therefore, better education for minority students.
The 1966 Coleman Report,41 and the 1972 Mosteller and
Moynihan reexamination of that report42 were not well received
in minority communities." Those reports concluded that rather
than the level of resources, classroom colleagues were a major
determinant of the achievement of minority group children.
When comparing the influence of fellow students with the influ-
ence of school facilities and the influence of staff, the Coleman
Report concluded that "attributes of other students account for
far more variation in the achievement of minority group chil-
dren" than the other factors. The new report of the Harvard Pro-
ject on School Desegregation, issued in December of 1993 and
examining the academic year 1991-92, repeats these findings.'
Professor Gary Orfield, director of the Project, indicates that it
is not just the mix of students but the fact that poor students in
a school not overwhelmed by poverty, and therefore not called
upon to serve all of the needs of its students, whether education-
al or not, succeed better.45 In addition to the lack of distractions
er fixed-cost expenses such as security and health without offsetting donations from
parents and community supporters.
40. See, e.g., Carter & Sandler, supra note 36 (focusing on issues in the Connecti-
cut school desegregation and financing cases of Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099
(Conn. 1985), and Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992)).
41. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
42. ON EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan,
eds., 1972).
43. See, e.g., Patricia Lines, Race and Learning: A Perspective on the Research, 11
INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 26 (1972) (describing the limitations of social science studies of
the effects of school desegregation).
44. Cells, supra note 17, at Al.
45. Jordana Hart, Poverty Takes Dramatic Toll on Education, Study Says; Many
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that accompany attempts to meet the nutritional, health, and
other non-academic needs of the students, higher expectations
regarding student performance, a different kind of peer pressure
regarding academic achievement, and the modeling that is ac-
quired from students who are not like them, cause students to
do better among less needy peers.46
C. The Law Regarding "Freedom of Choice"
1. Formerly de Jure Segregated Schools
Although the Supreme Court rejected the New Kent County
freedom-of-choice plan in 1968, it did not determine that a simi-
lar plan would be found to be unconstitutional in all circum-
stances.4 ' The Court decided that in desegregating a de jure
dual system, a plan based on freedom-of-choice "is not an end in
itself.... [Ilt is only a means to- a constitutionally required
end-the abolition of the system of segregation and its ef-
fects."" The Court conceded that freedom-of-choice plans may
be effective devices in fulfilling this duty.49
The Court has thereby empowered lower courts to validate
freedom-of-choice schemes proposed under school desegregation
plans, as long as those plans achieve an integrated result. At
least two recent opinions by the high court considering court-
ordered plans would suggest that newer plans, whether or not
fashioned as a remedy to intentional discrimination, may not
have to meet such a test.
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell," a 1991 Su-
preme Court decision, and Freeman v. Pitts,5 decided by the
Believe Segregation Crisis Is One of Money and Class More Than Race, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1994, at A27 (quoting ORFIELD, supra note 19).
46. Id.
47. Green v. New Kent Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
48. Id. at 440 (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir.
1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring)).
49. "Where [a freedom-of-choice plan] offers real promise of aiding a desegregation
program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, non-
racial system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove itself in
operation." Id. at 440-41.
50. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
51. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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Court in 1992, have been pessimistically interpreted as provid-
ing (1) an excuse for school systems that have attempted but not
succeeded in desegregating their schools and (2) ammunition for
those who would have the schools stop trying.
In both opinions, the Court remanded the cases for findings in
accord with the Court's determination that a segregated school
system's partial compliance with a desegregation order could
trigger the partial dissolution of the order, even if the schools
have not attained racial balance or have become resegregated
through "private decisionmaking and economics" such as resi-
dential patterns.52
Although proponents of school choice have always been aware
of the potential for resegregation of the schools, many have, as-
sumed that sensitivity and careful planning would alleviate any
projected imbalance" while others have been willing to sacri-
fice racial balance in exchange for greater parental choice and
the consequential influence and control that generally follows.'
Depending on the interpretation and implementation of the law
declared in Dowell and Freeman, students in segregated, un-
equal schools may find no relief under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution unless the official government (federal,
52. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 243 (1991); see also Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445, 1447.
[uIn the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the
authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incre-
mental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of
school operations. While retaining jurisdiction over the case, the court
may determine that it will not order further remedies in areas where the
school district is in compliance with the decree....
. .. Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been
remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that
is caused by demographic factors.
Id. at 1445-47.
53. Former Secretary of Education Terrel Bell and his co-author, Donna Elmquist,
propose parental choice as an incentive for educators to establish excellent schools.
TERREL H. BELL & DONNA L. ELmQUIST, HoW To SHAPE OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS 32
(1991). They recognize that problems of desegregation and transportation, deemed
"sensitive issues" by them, should be taken into account so that "unintended strati-
fication or resegregation" does not occur, and suggest as examples that "school
boards should encourage minority student enrollment in predominantly majority
schools and prohibit the concentration of minority students in one school." Id.
54. See Bell, supra note 7.
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state, or local) policy providing for or facilitating freedom-of-
choice constitutes state action and involves provable discrimina-
tory intent. Conceivably, therefore, there will be no legal redress
for these newly segregated schools.
In United States v. Fordice,55 decided in 1992, the Court, in
an opinion joined by eight of the nine Justices, sought to clarify
earlier rulings regarding the application of the Equal Protection
Clause to formerly de jure segregated higher education institu-
tions. These schools have adopted race neutral policies that have
nonetheless resulted in continued segregation or in resegregated
institutions. In doing so, the Court analogized to freedom-of-
choice plans in elementary and secondary schools, the subject of
this Essay.
Language in the opinion can be read as supporting the notion
that the adoption of policies such as educational choice that are
not only race-neutral on their face, but also race-neutral in
terms of intent, may nonetheless violate the Equal Protection
Clause if they result in segregated schools. Justice White, writ-
ing for the majority, indicated:
[We do not disagree with the Court of Appeals observation
that a state university system is quite different in very rele-
vant respects from primary and secondary schools. Unlike
attendance at the lower level schools, a student's decision to
seek higher education has been a matter of choice....
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals or the District
Court, however, that the adoption and implementation of
race-neutral policies alone suffice to demonstrate that the
State has completely abandoned its prior dual system. That
college attendance is by choice and not by assignment does
not mean that a race-neutral admissions policy cures the
constitutional violation of a dual system. ...
... If the State perpetuates policies and practices trace-
able to its prior system that continue to have segregative
effects-whether by influencing student enrollment decisions
or by fostering segregation in other facets of the university
system-and such policies are without sound educational
justification and can be practicably eliminated, the State has
55. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
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not satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled its
prior system. Such policies run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause, even though the State has abolished the legal re-
quirement that whites and blacks be educated separately and
has established racially neutral policies not animated by a
discriminatory purpose."
2. New Freedom-of-Choice Schools
Any speculation as to what significance Fordice has for ele-
mentary and secondary schools is just that-speculation. Even
more speculative is the question of what relevance decisions like
Dowell, Freeman, and Fordice might have for elementary and
secondary schools that cannot be said to be the product of de
jure segregation. Mississippi's dual system of higher education
had its historical roots in legislative mandates regarding sepa-
rate schools. The same can be said about the New Kent County
schools in 1968 and the schools that are the subject of Dowell
and Freeman. Teacher assignment policies, the retention of dis-
trict lines that include or exclude racially segregated neighbor-
hoods, and the maintenance of a pattern of curricular offerings
that traditionally appeal to either African-American or white
children may represent the perpetuation of policies and practices
that continue to have segregative effects. In Fordice, the Court
rejected the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that by sim-
ply adopting race-neutral policies, the system had met its affir-
mative obligation to disassemble the prior dual system. In enun-
ciating its disagreement with the lower court, the Supreme
Court noted that the fact that college attendance is by choice
and not by assignment does not cure the constitutional violation
because student attendance, even in a system based on choice, is
determined by many other factors that may or may not be at-
tributed to state policies.57 In declaring that new race-neutral
policies and practices that continue to have segregative effects
must be abandoned if they are "without sound educational justi-
fication and [they] can be practicably eliminated,"58 the Court
56. Id. at 2736-37.
57. Id. at 2736.
58. Id. at 2737.
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employed reasoning that may be useful in ascertaining whether
the new freedom-of-choice plans will pass constitutional muster
when the schools subject to the plans remain segregated.
a. In Formerly de Jure Segregated Districts
Determining whether the adoption of such a plan is constitu-
tional, in those systems that were under an obligation to dis-
mantle the remnants of a segregated dual system, despite hopes
to the contrary when Freeman and Dowell were announced,
would require, at the very least, establishing that the adoption
of school choice plans was preceded by an examination of the
educational justification for such plans. Because there is a
strong argument that school systems where freedom-of-choice is
promoted continue to be "tainted" by "racially identified schools
and the many other effects of a regime of segregation,"59 as
they were in 1968, the adoption of school choice in the face of
this prior discrimination might well be unjustified. "Controlled
choice" plans0 may prevent re-segregation of the schools and
thus escape the type of scrutiny that is suggested by Fordice.
"Open enrollment" plans, on the other hand, may not withstand
this test.
A controlled choice plan in effect for eleven years in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, has been highly praised.61 Originally,
the school system created the program in order to achieve inte-
gration without mandatory busing. 2 Under the plan, informing
parents about their options is a top priority. 3 In fact, before
parents may enroll their children in Cambridge schools, they
must visit an information center to learn about the programs
offered by each of the thirteen elementary schools in the city."
59. Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 749.
60. The term "controlled choice," as used here, refers to systems that take racial
balance into account in permitting transfers. Amy S. Wells, Quest for Improving
Schools Finds Role for Free Market, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1990, at Al, B8; see infra
text accompanying notes 62-70.
61. The term "open enrollment," as used here, refers to a system that makes no
effort to control for racial balance. See infra text accompanying note 71.
62. Wells, supra note 60, at 18.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Only then are parents allowed to register their children for their
top three school choices.' Taking parents' preferences into con-
sideration, the district makes assignments that maintain stu-
dent bodies representative of Cambridge's racial composition.66
Overall, the plan has received more praise than criticism.67
One reason for the support is that the district prohibits any one
school from having a monopoly on a popular program by offering
similar programs in multiple schools.' The district also is
praised for its policy of not closing less popular schools but fo-
cusing its attention on improving them.69
It is interesting to contrast the Cambridge city plan with
plans in other Massachusetts cities and with the proposed state-
wide plan. Of the state's 436 school districts, sixteen have adopt-
ed controlled choice programs."° In July 1991, Massachusetts
adopted a statewide choice program that differs from the con-
trolled choice programs in that (1) it allows parents to send
children to public schools in other districts with the state for-
warding the state aid from the student's home community to the
chosen school district and (2) it makes no attempt to achieve a
racial balance.71 The president of the American Federation of
Teachers, Albert Shanker, has described the Massachusetts plan
as "unusually punitive for urban children" because it allows
"suburban public schools to behave like selective private
schools." 7
2
Those who support statewide choice plans complain that con-
trolled choice "promotes a form of racial quotas or racial prefer-
ence for African-American and Hispanic students."" However,
advocates of controlled choice plans contend that such plans do
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Diego Ribadeneira, 642 Choose Schools Out of District, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6,
1991, at 17-18.
72. Muriel Cohen & Diego Ribadeneira, Schooling by Selection; Choice Plan Raises
Confusion, Worry over Fiscal Fairness, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 1991, at 1.
73. Robert A. Jordan, A School Plan That Does Work, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22,
1991, at 25.
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not give a preference to any racial group, but rather allocate
seats in schools "in proportion to the number of whites, blacks,
and Hispanics already enrolled in the school system."74
Critics of the free choice program argue that "poorer urban
and rural districts will lose students and funds to wealthier,
suburban communities, leaving the more-impoverished systems
in even more desperate straits."75 This criticism is becoming a
reality in Massachusetts. By September 1991, 642 students had
transferred into new districts, costing the school systems they
left at least $4 million.76 By failing to provide transportation or
money for transportation, Massachusetts' free choice program
discriminates against those who do not own cars, those who
cannot afford bus fare, and those who are unable to shuttle their
children to and from school at the required times.77
b. In Districts with No History of de Jure Segregation
Because school systems as diverse as Durham, Denver, Des
Moines, Montgomery, Minneapolis, and Milwaukee have been
subject to desegregation orders or consent decrees, it may be dif-
ficult to find school systems, especially large school systems,
that have not searched for remedies aimed at eliminating segre-
gation. If such school systems exist, or if some school systems
have been or will be relieved of the obligation to desegregate
based on the Dowell and Pitts decisions, a serious question aris-
es as to whether there is any remedy at law for segregated
schools. Even if the Fordice freedom-of-choice rationale for high-
er education carries over to elementary and secondary education,
Fordice is by its terms only applicable to previously dual sys-
tems. If, however, school boards and parents agree that race or
class balance in public schools is a good idea, how should school
choice plans be designed to fulfill the promise of Brown?
Race-conscious remedies involving controlled choice or magnet
schools raise additional questions regarding constitutional scru-
tiny, but some evidence shows that these plans, when directed
74. Id.
75. Ribadeneira, supra note 71, at 17.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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towards school desegregation, may merit different treatment
than that accorded other race-conscious remedies.78 Whether
such plans will be successful in cities like Des Moines, where
parents were able to challenge successfully an open enrollment
plan despite its controls to prevent racial tipping and the
resegregation of schools, remains an open question. As noted
above, in Cambridge the experiment has been deemed a suc-
cess.79 Des Moines hopes to achieve the same ends by a more
carefully crafted and developed plan. School board members
there feel hopeful that this effort will succeed.
II. CONCLUSION
In New Kent County, Virginia, in 1968, in response to the
mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, local authorities
adopted a freedom-of-choice plan designed to desegregate the
schools. In petitioning for relief in the actions that eventually
became known as Brown v. Board of Education, African-Ameri-
can parents and their advocates were motivated by a desire for
quality education for all children, black and white. Given the
social climate of the time, racial mixing seemed a prerequisite
for quality education. Separation necessarily was regarded as a
badge of inferiority.
Today's parents are motivated by similar concerns about the
lack of quality education for minority students. Forty years after
Brown, however, we have learned that minority students contin-
ue to suffer educational disadvantage in our public schools. We
have come full circle, albeit with strange bedfellows."s The pres-
ent focus on market solutions to the lack of quality education
has taken us once again to advocacy of freedom-of-choice as a
78. See, for example, the lengthy references to exceptional treatment of school
desegregation orders in Justice Scalia's concurrence in the leading case requiring
strict scrutiny of race-conscious remedies in one city's affirmative action "set-aside"
plan. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524-25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
79. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
80. Stuart Butler & Will Marshall, Rx for the Problem '90s: Some Odd-Couple
Politics, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1991, at M2 (describing a "post-ideological agenda" that
finds liberals and conservatives working together on matters such as school choice,
public housing, and homelessness).
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solution. The notion that quality education has some absolute
definition or measurable content that is not necessarily depen-
dent on equality of education has led many to renounce racial
balance or racial mixing as the touchstone of academic achieve-
ment. Inequality and a concern about inferiority no longer drive
the quality education movement. Empowerment-through con-
trol, multicultural education, and in many cases, separation-is
seen by many to be the ultimate solution to educational quality
concerns. A close reading of Brown suggests that this shift could
not have been anticipated in 1954.
Forty years later, as cities, including Topeka, Kansas, contin-
ue to grapple with the problems of racial separation and the lack
of quality education, school choice, though it may lead to school
segregation, is being proposed. Linda Brown Smith, the elemen-
tary school student whose father was the first named plaintiff in
the 1954 case, is a plaintiff in Brown III on behalf of her chil-
dren."' After opinions from the District Court of Kansas,82 the
Tenth Circuit,' and the Supreme Court,' the case was re-
manded to the Tenth Circuit to determine whether, in light of
Dowell and Pitts, the school district should be relieved of its ob-
ligation to implement a new desegregation plan.85 That court
determined that no viable plan had been implemented." After
the United State Supreme Court refused in 199387 to hear yet
another appeal, the parties in the litigation are devising new
plans, expected to be presented in May, 1994. We've come full
circle.
81. Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383, 391 n.4 (D. Kan. 1979) (Brown III).
82. Brown v. Board of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987).
83. Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1990).
84. Brown v. Board of Educ., 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992).
85. Brown v. Board of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2994 (1993).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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